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Abstract: 
The 2010-11 Tunisian revolution brought to the forefront of the country an explosion of activism 
and organizing from civil society, including multiple voices urging for the defense, protection 
and/or recognition of Tunisian ‘minorities.’ An unprecedented Amazigh (pl. Imazighen, the 
indigenous population of North Africa) wave of activism from individuals and organizations 
appeared in the public sphere of the country, a population systematically denied and 
marginalized by the Tunisian dictatorships and society emboldened to stand up for their rights 
and challenge the status quo. In the post-revolutionary context of thispseudo-homogenous North 
African country, dominated by a strong Arab/Islamic ideology since independence, Amazigh 
citizens and allieshave been mobilizing to bring up uncomfortable questions to their government 
andfellow civil society members. This paper seeks to explore this nascent movement through 
interviews with different actors involved in these contextuallynew and controversial discussions, 
with the objective of shedding light on this mostlyoverlooked subject and to 
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problematizecommon perceptions of the Tunisian Imazighen and the society’s supposed Arab 
homogeneity. 
Introduction: 
The 2010-11 Tunisian revolution brought to the forefront of the country an explosion of activism 
and organizing from civil society, an excited population no longer clamped down by the all-
powerful hand of an expired dictatorship. Loud organizations and individuals came forward with 
demands unheard of (or perhaps promptly silenced) in Tunisia’s republican history, including 
voices urging for the defense, protection and/or recognition of Tunisian ‘minorities.’ Groups 
ofJewish, black and Amazigh populations began organizing and forming plights unprecedented 
in the public sphere of Tunisia, a country that has been regarded as officially homogenous since 
its independence,under a strong nationalism greatly informed by Arab/Islamic ideology 
(Pouessel 2012, L’Année du Maghreb). The Imazighen (pl. for Amazigh), North Africa’s large and 
diverse indigenous population, have been present in the country’s history since time immemorial, 
and now exist in smallisolated and marginalized communities dispersed around the modern  
nation-state of Tunisia.The status and rights of the Tunisian Amazigh have remained painfully 
ambiguous, the autochthonous populations historically reduced toidyllic folklore and invisibility. 
Yet in the current continuing post-revolutionary democratic transition, organizations and 
individuals have been working to highlight the conditions and importance of the Imazighen in 
the country, active civil society members bringing up forgotten anduncomfortable questions to 
the mostly unaware Tunisian masses. 
 Through interviews with Tunisians actors involved in different sides of these contextually 
controversial topics, this project seeks to research and explore post-revolutionary pro-Amazigh 
activism in the country commonly regarded as the ‘birth of the Arab Spring’ and heading 
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towards the ‘first Arab democracy.’ Such an exploration intends to helpfill the gap in the 
academic coverage of the Tunisian Imazighen and their mobilizations, with the ambitious 
finalobjectives of helping to challenge the discourse of Tunisia’s supposed Arab homogeneity as 
well as the status quo of invisibility and exclusion of the Amazigh in the country’s mainstream 
public spheres. This aforementioned movement is quite new in the eyes of the Tunisian 
spectator, and, unlike in neighboring Morocco, Algeria, and Libya, the so-called ‘Berber 
question’ has never extensively occupied the government or its constituents’ attention.With this 
difficult reality in mind, what is the state of Amazigh rights and identity in post-revolutionary 
Tunisia? What are the objectives of pro-Amazigh civil society actors in Tunisia?To what extent 
were these movements existent under the Tunisian dictatorships? And what have been the 
greatest challenges and general response to their work? 
 The paper will be divided into six sections, beginning with a description of the research 
project’s methodology and limitations. This will be followed by a relatively brief (and inevitably 
partial) explanation of who the Imazighen are, the nature of their movement, and what their 
current status in Tunisia is, to contextualize post-revolutionary activism in the country. Then I 
will focus on the paper’s topic through a narrative-based recount of my meetings with different 
actors involved in Tunisian Amazigh activism, and a continuing discussion of the responses and 
challenges this movement is facing in ‘homogenous’ Tunisia. Next, I will very briefly highlight 
the uncomfortable lack of female voices in my research, followed by a final concluding section 
summarizing my findings and recommendations. However, before continuing, a clarification of 
word choice is at hand. This paper has and will use the words Amazigh/Imazighen (lit. “free 
man” in Tamazight,the Amazigh dialect of the Atlas Mountains, now used as an umbrella term 
for all Amazigh language) to refer to the native North African populations, instead of the 
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commonly used denomination, ‘Berber.’ The lattershould be deemed as a violently imposed and 
pejorative term,dating back to 7th century Islamic conquests, when Arab conquerors utilized 
theArabic word barbar (“babble noisily”) to refer to the Imazighen and their language; barbaris 
also closely related to barbaroi(“barbarians”), which was how Greek and Roman texts referred 
to these populations (Maddy-Weitzman 2011, p. 2). The term was later revived during the 19th 
century European colonization of Africa, when strategic, ill-intentioned interest on these 
populations surged (Brett and Fentress 1996, p. 188-90).Variations of ‘Amazigh’ has been 
historicallyused byNorth African natives to refer to themselves(Camps 2007, p. 98-9), with 
regional differences in pronunciationadjusted and standardized by the growing transnational 
movement of Amazigh activists around the world.Usingthe terminology of the Imazighen’s 
multiple conquerors only perpetuates cycles of domination, denial and oppression. 
 
Methodology and Limitations: 
To achieve my research objectives and answer my guiding questions, I first delved into diverse 
physical and online literature on the Amazigh, particularly looking for academic articles, 
institutional reports, books and news pieces that focused on theTunisian Imazighen. Given the 
topic and the relatively limited attention it has received, I heavily relied on sources written in 
French, which I have personally translated when directly quoted. I then proceeded to find, 
establish contact and meet with Tunisians interested or involved with pro-Amazigh activism 
through academic, professional and personal networks of SIT Tunisia, as well as through social 
media, emailing and communication with foreign Amazigh organizations. It was no easy task to 
reach and interview actual individuals in or near the capital given their small numbers, the 
concentration of the majority of Amazigh communities in the south of the country, and the 
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reality that this movement is quite new and reasonably suspicious of people external to 
it.Moreover, I pushed to meet with an official from the Tunisian Ministry of Culture and 
Patrimony through SIT Tunisia networks to learn about their standpoint, yet they refused to 
discuss these topics, an issue that will be further addressed later in this paper. All direct quotes 
and references related to this paper’s interviewees are based on personal meetings with them 
between November and December 2014 in Tunis and SidiBou Said. 
 Indeed, the difficulties and limitations of my project could have been enough to 
discourage its execution, yet they can also be considered as further evidence of how invisible and 
isolated the Imazighen are in Tunisia. As mentioned, the fact that I was living and limited to 
Tunis (due to time constraint and logistical factors) and its surrounding areas bounded the reach 
of my research to Tunisians stationed or passing by the capital; my project automatically 
excludes the numerous organizations and individuals inhabiting and/or locally working in the 
actual Tunisian Amazigh communities. The small (and generally unaccounted for) number of 
Imazighen in the country multiplied the difficulties of my investigation, forcing me to spend 
more time finding individuals who could relate to my topic than actually interviewing them. 
When finishing my interviews, I insisted on receiving other contacts from my interviewees, yet 
all of them invariably kept leading me to men; this huge sex gap is addressed later in the paper. 
My language skills also posed an obstacle and weakness for my study, as my Modern Standard 
Arabic and Tunisian dialect were not strong enough to utilize in research, limiting my findings to 
French and English texts and discussions. An added problem to my studies was how the majority 
of Tunisians I met during my time in the capital possessed an almost absolute ignorance or denial 
of remaining Tunisian Amazigh populations and this civilization’s tremendous role in the 
country’s history, and although this perceived reality does add to the argument and value of my 
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project, researching my topic in this contextwas not an easy task. Finally, I had to conform to 
how Tunisian Amazigh populations, marginalization and activism are mostly ignored 
inmainstream Western academia; they are usually only acknowledged (or disregarded) with 
painfully over-generalizing statements referring to their apparently feeble number in Tunisia. It 
is my hope that this paper can help reduce this scholarly void. 
 
Contextualizing theImazighen in the Republic of Tunisia: 
Before discussing my findings on post-revolutionary activism, it is necessary to have a grasp of 
who the Amazigh are and how their recent history has shaped the Tunisian reality, as well as in 
what wider background these movements are appearing. As stated above, Amazigh groups are 
(undeniably) North Africa’s native population, and their culture has formed the basis of “the 
whole North African edifice” (Hart 1999). Yet throughout mainstream recorded history, the 
Imazighen have repeatedly encountered more powerful invading forces, with their responses 
ranging from “resistance and retreat to embracing and assimilating into the new order” (Maddy-
Weitzman 2012, p. 112); such a context has perpetuated a historical narrative that exclusively 
retells the conquerors’ acts, and portrays Amazigh populations as almost a-historic actors, their 
role as “protagonists in their own history” lost in the process (Brett and Fentress 1996, p. 7). A 
large aspect of modern Amazigh activism has consisted in pushing to shift this notion and re-
affirm the unacceptably overlooked significance of their peoples to their countries, but due to the 
tremendous hegemony of Arabist ideology in North Africa’s postcolonial sociopolitical spheres 
and traumatic episodes of violence between the state and these populations, these discussions 
have been tremendously sensitive, to the point of being perceived asunacceptably dangerous to 
national balances of power. Current Amazigh activism is further complicated by the fact that 
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during therecent European colonization of the region, French conquerors placed
ata higher social category than Arab North Africans, utilizing the former to 
and deal with the “untrustworthy Arabs of the plains and cities” (
190). In this hostile environment
their respective North African dictatorships/monarchies/civil chaos
phenomenon (known as the Amazigh Culture Movement) has developed
Amazigh groups in extremely different 
‘artificial national boundaries’ 
throughout Tamazgha, the Tamazight
used for the land that spreads from Egypt’s 
Western Desert to the Canary Islands in the 
Atlantic Ocean(Maddy-Weitzman 2011, p. 
4-8) (see figure 1).Greatly helped by the 
rise of international human rights discourse 
and decentralized communication 
technologies, this amorphous global 
movement has increasingly 
accomplishments being the eventual establishment of the
(CongrèsMondial Amazigh, CMA)
An international NGO, the CMA has aimed to bring together, organize and stand up for Amazigh 
communities in Tamazgha and abroad, and although it has succeeded in its a
expansion, a certain tension has multiplied
CMA (who, for better or worse, advocate for a united, partially homogeneous Amazigh identity)
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Figure 1:Tamazgha, considered to be the land of the 
Amazigh by Amazigh Culture Movement; in Tifinagh 
script: ⵜⵜⵜⵜⵜⵜ (
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and more local-oriented Amazigh leaders (who refuse the disconnected CMA’s homogeneous 
discourse and arguefor localized activism in the inherently heterogeneousAmazigh 
communities)(Pouessel 2010).  
 With this short, yet certainly complex, backdrop in mind, what are, then, the 
characteristics and conditions of the Imazighen in Tunisia? The controversy of referring to 
Amazigh groups in Tunisia begins with defining exactly who fits into the category of ‘Tunisian 
Amazigh’ and how many of them there are in the country. For the purpose of this paper, 
Amazigh communities should be generally conceived as those that preserve and/or affirm their 
indigenous language, culture or distinct identity, with the acknowledgment that a cultural identity 
is not solely composed by linguistic factors and can easily transcend them. Unfortunately, the 
official Tunisian censuses do not provide information regarding language usage or ethnicity, yet 
multiple estimates calculate that only 1% of Tunisians (~100,000) are Tamazight-speakers 
(Maddy-Weitzman 2011, p. 1), while more politically charged assessments argue that the 
number reaches up to 10% of the total population, that is, 1 million inhabitants (CongrèsMondial 
Amazigh2011). Nevertheless, it is mostly recognized that Amazigh communities in the country 
are found in small villages in the south-center of Tunisia and in the island of Djerba(Maddy-
Weitzman 2012, p. 132), usually in self-isolated spaces created to preserve themselves and their 
identityvis-à-vis their historically unwelcoming external environment.Throughout the republic’s 
history, the Habib Bourghiba (1957-1987) andZine El Abidine Ben Ali (1989-
2011)dictatorshipspushed forward an almost obsessiveArab-centered nationalist program, 
leading to a recurring denial of the Tunisian Imazighen, their contributions and cultural rights 
(see next page’s Table 1).Indeed, the Tunisian nation-state, as a counter response to French 
colonialism, was constructed around a “unicist identity rhetoric around Arab culture and Islamic 
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Table 1: Instances of Amazigh exclusion in Tunisian law (adapted from CongrèsMondial Amazigh 
2011 and Said 2014) 
religion,”1 and with its low Amazigh presence, it developed a pervasive discourse of flawless 
homogeneity, an artificial idea commonly relayed by social sciences research (Pouessel 
2012,Frontièresidentitairesp. 3). According to Pouessel (2012,L’Année du Maghreb), in the 1970s, 
the “problem” of bilingual Arabic-Tamazight Tunisians bound schoolteachers to “de-Berberize” 
students, and the Arabophone pressure switchedAmazighophones from a majority to minority 
status in villages of the south. 
Tunisia is constituted 
as part of the “Arab 
family” and the Greater 
Arab Maghreb, with 
Arabic as its language 
and Islam its religion. 
Legal denial of 
Amazigh culture and 
civilization. 
Tunisian 
Arab/Muslim identity 
is reaffirmed, and 
proclaims 
Arabization as a 
“pressing 
civilizational 
demand.” Brutal 
negation of Amazigh 
reality. 
Advocates raising 
children with pride of 
Tunisian identity and a 
sense of civilizational 
belonging to the 
nation, the Maghreb, 
and the Arab/Muslim 
world. Amazigh 
identity not 
recognized. 
Original Tunisian 
constitution is 
remodeled, with 
preamble 
reasserting that its 
language is Arabic 
and religion Islam. 
No mentioning of 
Amazigh heritage.  
1959: First Constitution 
of Tunisian Republic 
1988: National Pact 
of Tunisia 
1995: Child Protection 
Code 
2014: New Tunisian 
Constitution 
In Bourghibist Tunisia, ‘Berberity’ rhymed “with an outdated rurality” and began serving as bait 
for“tourism thirsty for exoticism, for primitivism.”2The unquestionable Amazigh origins of 
Tunisia and its people were transformed into an idea of a remote and folkloric past, an 
unimportant figment of the national identity overpowered by the stronger state-promoted 
Arabism: a study on official Tunisian educational textbooks by researcher DrissAbbassi(2008) 
relates how in schools, since independence, the country’s Amazighroots have been continuously 
pushed aside for the supposed essential Arabness of North Africa, with only a short recognition 
of Tunisia’s Amazigheity in the post-Bourghiba, late 1980s textbooks (references to this 
Amazigheity, however, almost completely disappeared once again starting in the 1990s). More 
recently, contemporary scholarship has continued to play with the very political and misleading 
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mythof the Imazighen’s Arab origins, with books such asThe Berber: Ancient Arabs (Tunis: 
2000) and The Arabness of the Berber: The Hidden Truth (Damascus: 1992) reaching Tunisian 
audiences and academia(Liebhaber 2012). 
 Nonetheless, when considering these problematic evidences of Amazigh marginalization, 
it is important to remind ourselves that, in the case of Tunisia, Amazigh communities have 
always represented a tremendously small populationwith little political voice. In comparative 
terms, Tunisian Amazigh activism in postcolonial times has been inexistent next to the large 
political role played by Amazigh groups in neighboring Morocco, Algeria, and Libya. That being 
said, the fact remains that these communities have and continue to exist in a state of exclusion 
and denial, with their numbers greatly decimated by strong policies enforced by the country’s 
dictatorial regimes (more examples of this systematic marginalization will be provided 
throughout the rest of this paper). There is also the very real contextual explanation for the 
apparent inexistence of these movements before the 2010-11 revolution, as a minority-led, 
explicitly anti-establishment cause based in the south of the country would have been promptly 
silenced by Bourghiba and his successor. Indeed, almost immediately after the departure of Ben 
Ali, an unprecedented wave of pro-Amazigh organizing and movement-building appeared in the 
public sphere of Tunisia: in the context of the uprisings that shook North Africa and the Middle 
East in  2011, Willis (2012) recognizes thatTunisia’s small Amazigh population “was 
emboldened (…) to demand greater rights for itself, arguing for official recognition in the [then] 
forthcoming constitution” (p. 228-9). The quick and spontaneous appearance of this activism in 
itself proves the artificial nature of Tunisia’s imaginedhomogeneity, the injustice these 
communities have witnessed under their crushing governments, and their will to speak up. 
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Figure 2:Amazigh flag, created in 1970s 
by French Berber Academy; adopted by 
CMA in 1998. The yaz() represents the 
Amazigh “free man” (Mysid 2006) 
 
Post-Revolutionary Tunisian Amazigh Activism:
On July 30, 2011, only six months following
Amazigh association was officially
Amazigh Culture (L’AssociationTunisienne de la Culture Amazighe
led by then-26-year old student Khadija Ben Saidane (Maddy
previously announced the creation of this 
outlineof its ambitious (and contentious)
Tamazightlanguage,guarantees of 
civilization as an “essential component of Tunisian identity,” and preservation of customs and 
architecture of Amazigh villages 
founding members of the association, Anis Mokn
“consciousness.” It wasn’t until F
physical meeting to “seek how to push the movement on the field, not only virtually.”
to Suárez Collado(2013), Tunisian Amazigh activism has been greatly empowered and facilitated 
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 the fall of Tunisia’s dictatorship
 established in the capital, the Tunisian Association for 
, 
-Weitzman 2012). Ben Saidane had 
body on April 2011 through a press conference
objectives: the recognition of the 
constitutional rights for the Imazighen, recognition of this 
(Al-Ayadi 2012).I had the opportunity to meet one of the 
i (36), introduced to me by Tunisian
HoudaMzioudet, who in turn met him during the 
2013 World Social Forum (hosted in Tunis).
wearing a bracelet displaying the Amazigh flag (see 
Figure 2), Mokni recounted how self
Amazigh activists like himself only knew each other 
before the revolution through online forums and 
Facebook, each of them contributing with their ideas 
and experiences to discover their shared Amazigh 
ebruary 2011 when these online actors decided to organize a 
Janon 
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by online platforms, leading to a “renaissance of identity resistance” (p. 383) as well as quick 
and widespread successful calls to manifestations and action around the country.4This was 
precisely what allowed the Tunisian Association for Amazigh Culture to form in such a fast 
fashion, and with the excitement of the newly obtained post-revolutionary freedoms, Mokni and 
his partners thrust their movement forward and garnered more and more public attention. Yet 
they began facing challenges from the very beginning in their first February meeting, when they 
brainstormed to decide on their group’s name. According to Mokni, to avoid tensions with 
Tunisian society, the activists decided to insert the word ‘cultural’ in the name of their 
association so as to make it sound “softer:” “The word Amazigh is confusing for Tunisians. They 
ask us: You want our country to change religion? To change language? You want to separate us 
from our religion?” In the midst of these predictable reactionary responses, the association had to 
adapt to be able to exist and be permitted to operate in the fragile post-revolutionary context.  
 Anis Mokni, however, was not born in an Amazigh community nor has explicit familial 
evidence of his Amazigh origins, yet he refuses to pretend that Tunisia (and by extension 
himself) is homogeneously Arab: “It’s not logical to be Arab because of Arabic. We can speak 
Spanish in Mexico, but we’re not Spanish. There are more pieces that contribute to identity than 
only language.” For him, the supposed Arabness of Tunisia comes from a bombardment of 
Arabist ideology, backed by post-independence exclusionary policies taken by the government 
against Amazigh communities and Tunisia’s Amazigh origins. He offered me with three concrete 
examples of such actions, which he argued for based on existing documentation: 1) after 
independence and following new development models, Bourghiba decided to make new urban 
centers in the south,his bureaucracy instructed to force the Imazighen out of their villages and 
lifestyles into newly built cities, with the consequences of not only a loss of culture and identity, 
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but the pressure of making Tamazight speakers to learn and solely utilize Arabic to deal with 
Bourghiba’s machinery and their new environment; 2) when Bourghiba began developing the 
new Tunisian state and enforcing border laws, he faced the nomadic Amazigh Touareg (who, 
according to Mokni, had multiple and historical transactions and movements throughout southern 
Tunisia) and told them that they could either stay in Tunisia and become sedentary, or leave and 
not be a part of the new state; and 3) during the 1970s, increasingly marginalized Tunisian 
Amazigh communities were starting to be strongly influenced and aroused by the rising Amazigh 
activism in Algeria, so Bourghiba warned them that if they wanted Amazigheity, they could go 
to Algeria.For Mokni, Tunisia is undeniably Amazigh, and its citizens can find it everywhere in 
their lives and surroundings; his activism is precisely about raising this Amazigh consciousness 
and incorporating it into the Tunisian identity, which he calls “vulnerable” due to its weak and 
artificial Arab base, centered around homogeneity and anincomplete historical memory. 
 Very soon after meeting Anis Mokni and learning about his provocative ideas, I 
unexpectedly received an email back from the Amazigh Collective in France (Collectif des 
Amazighsen France), which I had written to in my multiple attempts at finding active civil 
society members in the capital. They offered me the contact information of Ghaki Jalloul (only 
described to me in the message as a “militant Tunisian comrade”), who through a phone call at 
once agreed to meet me on my terms and availability. To my surprise and embarrassment, I 
eventually found out during our interview that he was the new president of the Tunisian 
Association for Amazigh Culture,as Khadija Ben Saidane had just recently moved to France.5At 
58 years old, Jalloul has been involved in Tunisian pro-Amazigh work for a long time, and, 
unlike Mokni, he is a Tamazight-speaker born and raised in an Amazigh community in the south 
of the country, described by him as one of the remaining “24 villages that still speak Tamazight.” 
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He had been a political prisoner and labeled as a “terrorist” under the dictatorships due to his 
activism, his only crime being peaceful manifestations and seeking to preserve Tamazight 
through different methods: before the revolution, he and his peers were strictly forbidden toclaim 
their rights as indigenous communities and user their language in official public events, yet they 
remained active in that context. 
 Ghaki Jalloul described to me how the Bourghiba/Ben Ali bureaucraciespurposefully 
allowed the existenceof only 3 local Amazigh associations in the entire country, their only 
permitted responsibility to organize an annual patrimony festival (which had to be in Arabic, 
follow governmental guidelines and last no more than 3 days). Mokni mentioned to me that the 
Algerian government did a similar thing by only giving official state recognition to the Kabyle 
region’s Imazighen; this strategic act fragmented communities, weakened the identity, and 
reinforced the discourse that the country is not Amazigh in origin or essence by only giving this 
nameto populationsisolated from the mainstream postcolonial state. For Jalloul, his association’s 
main objective is to constitutionalize the cultural rights of the Tunisian Amazigh in order to 
protect the disappearing patrimony, safeguard the language, and vindicate the identity. He 
describes his fight as the same as that of every other Amazigh activist in the country, the 
particularity of his work being that it aims at a national rather than local level. Utilizing the 
framework of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (which 
Tunisia ironically signed unto on November 28 2007), Jalloul strive forthe improvement of the 
status of the Tunisian Imazighen. 
 While seeking additional ways into the Tunisian Amazigh activist networks, I spoke with 
Carima Jerad (55), a self-identified Amazigh by origin who works as an English teacher for 
tourism students in the Institute of Advances Tourism Studies of SidiDhrif (Institut des 
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hautesétudestouristiques de SidiDhrif).6 She described herself as a “moderate” Amazigh, and has 
not been involved in this nascent movement due to time constraints and an ultimate disagreement 
with anything that would separate Tunisian society. This last view is an idea shared by many 
Tunisians I encountered during my timein the country, and it has been a major discursive 
obstacle for the Amazigh movement (this will be further elaborated in the following section). 
Nevertheless, Jerad expressed that she would be “very happy to see Tunisia see itself” as 
Amazigh, since the Imazighen are the people that actually belong to this country and they 
represent the real identity of Tunisia. While speaking with her and learning about her views, she 
kept referring to the new Amazigh association of the country, which I assumed to be the one 
founded by Ben Saidane, Mokni, Jalloul and their partners. 
 However, when Jerad eventually offered to introduce me to the “association’s president,” 
she directed me to Khaled Khemira, the middle-aged secretary general of the Twiza Association 
for Patrimony, Solidarity and Development (Association Twiza pour le patrimoine, la solidarité 
et le développement).7 Working separately from the Tunisian Association for Amazigh Culture, 
Twiza was created on April 2011 and gained an official status on October 31 of the same year. 
Like its name indicates, it seeks to work on three strategic areas: the safeguard of the material 
and immaterial Amazigh patrimony of Tunisia; solidarity with all Amazigh ancestors, relatives 
and successors; and development of the historically marginalized regions where Amazigh 
communities are concentrated. I asked Khemira what made his group different from that of 
Jalloul, and he simply stated that it was a matter of priorities: according to him, the Tunisian 
Association for Amazigh Culture has been focusing in politics and the political recognition of the 
Imazighen and their role in the Tunisian identity, while Twiza has aimed to work on the recovery 
of the Amazigh patrimony and cultural vitality (which, once achieved, can secure a place in the 
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political sphere afterwards). His group wants Tunisia to see itself as a “pluricultural” society and 
to replace the “rejection spirit” that has dominated the country since independence with the 
“acceptance spirit” that has characterized Amazigh culture and society throughout history. In the 
context of my research, Khemira strongly highlighted that this post-revolutionary movement, its 
actors and its ideasare not new at all, but rather just now being heard and seen thanks to the 
departure of the country’s repressive regimes. In the 1980s, he started to become involved in 
these questions and petitioned to create an Amazigh-centeredassociation exactly like Twiza, but 
got immediately rejected. His group decided to change ‘Amazigh’ for ‘Berber’ in its name so as 
to appease the government, yet received the same negative response and saw his ideatransfigured 
by the official bureaucracy into a “protection of the environment” association. Similarly, he 
worked to launch an Amazigh music festival, which he saw rejected; he changed the name to 
“Berber Music Festival,” and received approval onlyif he changed it once again to “Mountain 
Music Festival.” Now, Khemira and his allies have been able to operate with more freedom, yet 
he sees no genuine interest or support from the government in his work. 
 From the perspective of Khaled Khemira, it is incorrect to refer to his activism as part of 
a ‘minority movement,’ which is how mainstream coverage of these questions has generally 
called it. Indeed, there is a big language minority when it comes to Tamazight-speakers in 
Tunisia, and Tunisians that self-identify as Amazigh or embrace their Amazigheity represent a 
minority as well, but, for Khemira (similar to what Mokni argues for), the discourse should 
switch to see Tunisia as an Amazigh society, as a country built on Amazigh foundations. 
Khemira mentioned to me that it has been proven that at least 60% of Tunisians are ethnically 
Imazighen and that 80% of modern Tunisian culture is Amazigh in essence; with these facts in 
mind, to call Tunisia’s Amazigheity as a ‘minority issue’ is illogical and perpetuates 
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themisleading ideas of Arab/Islamic ideology. Khemira considers the shift of the 
dominantdiscourse to be urgent due to the reality of globalization: if Tunisia keeps holding onto 
the weak and artificial homogenous Arab identity created and supported by its dictatorial 
regimes, it will find itself lost in the face of the world, as its citizens will not have their own real 
particularities to refer back to. And if Tunisian society does not realize the undeniable 
importance of their Amazigh roots, it would unjustly allow remaining Amazigh communities to 
disappear, letting go of these groups’ irrecoverable knowledge, unwritten history and complex 
patrimony. 
 The new awakening of Tunisian Amazigh activism after the revolution led to empowered 
manifestations, the celebration of Amazigh cinema at the Maghreb film festival, the first-ever 
hosting of the World Amazigh Congress in Tunisia (in Djerba, September 30 to October 2 2011), 
and a gathering of researchers atCEMAT (Centre d’EtudesMaghrébines à Tunis)on March 6 
2012 for Amazigh language, culture, and society (Maddy-Weitzman 2012). This last event was a 
milestone for the movement, “the first ever Amazigh (Berber) Symposium since Tunisian 
independence in 1956” (Mzioudet 2012).The 2012 CEMAT symposium featured presentations 
from then-president of the Tunisian Association for Amazigh Culture Khadija Ben Saidane, 
Middlebury College professor Sam Liebhaber, and Walid Ben Omrane, a researcher in Amazigh 
culture from Djerba. I decided to reach out through Facebook to Ben Omrane, who I quickly 
discovered now serves as the director of the Executive Bureau ofCongrès pour la République 
(CPR), which is the political party of MoncefMarzouki, one of the two presidential candidates to 
face off in the December 28 2014 second round of national elections. To my surprise, just like all 
my other interviewees, Ben Omrane accepted to meet me with no hesitation, finding an hour of 
space in his tremendously busy schedule for me.8 
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 In his late 20s, Ben Omrane’s particular political role automatically placed him in a very 
different position than the rest of my interviewees: although involved in nominallypro-Amazigh 
work before gaining his current job, I knew that his involvement in CPR would perhaps inform 
his perspective. However, throughout our meeting, he fortunately based his approach to this topic 
off his personal experiences and academic studies. A friend of Ben Saidane, Walid Ben Omrane 
was asked by her to be part of the 2012 CEMAT symposium due to his master’s thesis in 
sociolinguistics on the Amazigh languages of Tunisia in the University of Paris VIII. He told me 
how his studies showed him the ways aggressive Arabizationprograms affected Tamazight-
speakers, and how figments of Amazigh culture were nevertheless preserved by communities 
integrating Tunisian Tamazight into the Tunisian Arabic dialect. According to him, under the 
choking Tunisian dictatorships there was an absolute denial of the Imazighen and any other 
perceived ‘minority’ that could pose a threat to the Arab-centered status quo: he argues that 
people were totally “unaware of culture,” a natural effect of iron-fisted authoritarian regimes. 
However, although he understands and supports the basic ideas behind the Tunisia’s rising 
Amazigh movement, he has been “prudent” towards it because of the risk that it could become 
overly political, a stance shared by Khemira against the association founded by Ben Saidane. 
This fragmentation represents one of the many challenges toTunisian Amazigh activism, the 
focus of this paper’s next section. 
 
Responses and Challenges to Amazigh Movements in ‘Homogeneous’ Tunisia: 
While researching about Khaled Khemira’sTwiza Association for Patrimony, Solidarity and 
Development, Iran into a new, youth-led cultural space with the same name, TWIZA, which 
states in its Facebook page that it chose the name after “a berber word [sic] describing a life-style 
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based on sharing and collective participation”(https://www.facebook.com/twizaworkinprogress). 
After reaching out to the group’s Facebook, I met one of the group’s leaders, Simona, seeking to 
learn more about the contextually controversial decision to choose a Tamazight word for their 
cultural center.9 She took me to its space, located in the medina and bearing a red sign reading 
TWIZA in Tifinagh script (), and quickly admitted that the name came out of pure 
coincidence and ingenuity, from the interest of one of the group’s founding member in Amazigh 
culture and language. Acknowledging that “Amazigh culture has been lost in Tunisia,” she 
apologized for not being able to provide much help in my research. However, before leaving, I 
asked her about the sign outside of the space, and she told me that it has caused a stir among 
medina neighbors and passing strangers: she has received numerous complaints about it, with 
weary Tunisian men asking about its origins, demanding her to take the non-Arabic script down, 
and declaring that TWIZA is, like other Amazigh groups, working to separate Tunisia. These are 
precisely the common responses received by Amazigh activists operating in the country, with 
suspicious Tunisians afraid and uncomfortable about this no longer silenced topic. 
 Ghaki Jalloul recounted to me how during his work and activism, he’s received violent 
calls from Tunisians calling him a “separatist” (as if he is working to make the Imazighen secede 
from the republic), “atheist” (given his commitment to push Tamazight forward and the link 
between Arabic and Islam), and even “Israeli” (because of completely ludicrous theories that 
connect many Tunisian Imazighen’s Judaism and non-Arabiclanguage preference to Israel). 
Indeed, while looking for this project’s interviewees and discussing its themes with other 
Tunisians, I received reactions ranging from absolute ignorance and indifference to the subject, 
to words of advice discouraging me to follow pointless and decontextualized research, to 
declarations that this could be an American-financed plot to fragment and confuse the only 
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succeeding Arab Spring country. As mentioned, Carima Jerad expressed to me that many of her 
reservations with Amazigh activism come from the fact that these discussions could split the 
Tunisian nation (and, because Amazigh communities are in the south of Tunisia, lead to further 
empowerment of Islamist groups that could use social fragmentation for their purposes). Twiza’s 
Khaled Khemira explains these responses as misunderstandings of the movement’s cultural goals 
and as natural replies to the political language and methods utilized by groups like the Tunisian 
Association for Amazigh Culture. Indeed, according to Anis Mokni, whenever he speaks with 
Tunisians about questions regarding their national identity and Amazigh consciousness, he 
usually receives very positive responses and agreement about Tunisia’s Amazigheity; Khemira 
echoed this sentiment, declaring that almost everyone he’s spoken with about these topics ends 
on his side (if he remains apolitical and open). For CPR’s Walid Ben Omrane, the common 
“separationist fears” of many Tunisians when approached with the Amazigh question stems from 
the experience of Tunisia’s “big sister” Algeria and the civil chaos brought by Amazigh activism 
in the ‘Berber Spring’ of the 1980s. He, too, only supports the movement culturally and in fact 
warned me of referring to it as such when speaking with Tunisians: “You should be careful with 
the words you use. I would call it an Amazigh ‘expression,’ not an Amazigh movement.” 
 Beyond the misguided public response to active Amazigh actors, there is an 
accompanying resistance of the new and evolving Tunisian government in getting involved with 
the subject of Amazigh rights and cultural recognition.In 2011,Ghaki Jalloul helped to organize 
and execute a large protest in Tunis to demand that the Imazighen and their language be included 
in the new Tunisian constitution. As part of their demonstrations, the Amazigh activists remained 
from 9AM to 3PM in front of where the National Constituent Assembly met to 
peacefullyconfront politicians willing to discuss these topics. He remembers receiving an 
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implicit yet strong “unanimous negation” from the government, with only 1 of the 217 member 
of the Assembly coming out to have a conversation the entire day. Similarly, through the 
networks of an SIT Tunisia staff member, I made an attempt to contact and meet with a 
representative of the Tunisian Ministry of Culture and Patrimony to discuss the topic of the 
Tunisian Imazighen and their status. I expected a level of resistance, and even a reasonable 
refusal to meet due to the busy elections season we were in, yet the eventual response was worse: 
I learned through a text message that, on an official level, the Ministry of Culture doesn’t “work 
on these issues because it is sensitive and the country is not ready to launch the minorities 
debate.” For Khaled Khemira, this almost absolute lack of support from the Tunisian government 
is a major obstacle in the survival of the movement, especially considering the financial 
limitations this position poses. Yet Walid Ben Omrane provides insight into the government’s 
indifference: he expressed to me how it is currently more important for the Tunisian constitution 
and state to recognize and protect basic liberties over particular identities and ethnicities. He 
drew a contrast with Morocco, where the new constitution recognizes the Imazighen yet limits 
human freedoms, which are indeedsafeguarded by the new Tunisian constitution over specific 
identities. On this topic, I pushed him to consider how Tunisia’s origins lie in 
Amazigheity(which he recognized in his studies), yet the new constitution calls the republic Arab 
and Muslim, but he showed indifference by declaring that this issimply a reflection of the 
perceived reality in the “collective imaginary of the Maghreb.”Perhaps there is validity to the 
idea that it might be too early in the post-revolutionary context for the government to bring up 
the controversial and uncomfortable ‘minority questions,’ yet to this Khemira responds that, 
throughout his life’s activism, he has been perpetually told by the Tunisian governments that“it’s 
not the time yet” to address Amazigh questions, and he believes that it will be too late very soon. 
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 Alongside these negative public and governmental responses, the Tunisian Amazigh 
cause has been further hindered by other internal challenges, mainly 
significantmovementfragmentation and little to no financial capabilities. The political-cultural 
difference of the Tunisian Association for Amazigh Culture and the Twiza Association for 
Patrimony, Solidarity and Development is one example of the marked split among Tunisian 
Amazigh activists. Anis Mokni actually left Jalloul’s association very soon after its official 
establishment because he sensed that the group was being co-opted by political interests of many 
of its members; with much frustration, he said that manyself-appointed representatives of this 
nascent movement are terrible voices of its actual goals and ideology. As hinted, Khemira is also 
very critical of making his activism too political in name or nature, both because of the 
reactionary response this generates, and because it is simply not what this cultural movement 
requires at this point. According to Mokni,another aspect of activist fragmentationcomes from 
the division betweenTamazight-speaking activists (who were born in Amazigh communities and 
can claim to be factually ‘ethnically Amazigh’) and active Tunisians claiming the Amazigheity 
of their country and themselves: the former believe that the movement and its members must 
learn the language to be a part of it, even opposing or rejecting the non-Tamazight-speaking/non-
ethnically-Amazighindividuals who focus on the consciousness aspect of their ideology. This 
split also relates to the aforementioned division between activists who want to work on the 
transnational level of Amazigh pride (preferring organizations like CMA) and those that want 
focus on their local communities and their survival: Pouessel (2012, L’Année du Maghreb) states 
that Tunisian Amazigh mobilization, despite its young age, is already fragmented because of this reason. 
 In terms of financial limitations, because of the general resistance of the Tunisian 
government and public, activism has had to come from the resources and means of those wanting 
change to occur: Ghaki Jalloul made a point on this unfortunate fact (especially since he is 
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constantly faced by paranoid Tunisians claiming he’s serving ulterior motives) and how his 
association meets in its members’ houses, which also serve as improvised office and storage 
spaces. Likewise, Khaled Khemira expressed that, without a doubt, the biggest challenge to his 
association and work has been their finances. This issue is further problematized by how, in the 
perspective of Anis Mokni, funds from external sources and foundations almost inevitably 
comewith political or ideological strings attached (he sees this as a problem in the CMA). 
 
Addressing the Movement’s Apparent Lack of Female Voices: 
When meeting Ghaki Jalloul, he constantly emphasized how his association refuses Tunisia’s 
patriarchal status quo: the decision to choose Khadija Ben Saidane as its first president was 
informed by these ideas, and it there has been an equal representation of the sexes in its 
executive bureau since its foundation. For him, the importance of women in Amazigh culture 
reinforces these acts: they are the preservers of culture and identity. Walid Ben Omrane, who 
studied these topics as part of his master’s thesis, stated to me that Amazigh women are the ones 
that teach Tamazight to their children and are usually not allowed to marry outside of the 
community because of their tremendous cultural role. And yet, as I continued seeking for more 
voices to include in my research, I quickly noticed that I kept being referred to more men, even 
when I insisted that I greatly needed female actors as well. I decided to bring up this subject to 
Khaled Khemira, yet he disregarded it as unimportant and distracting for the movement, arguing 
that Tunisia’s women have counted with protection and equality almost since the republic’s 
independence. This last point might be true to a certain extent, but the fact remains that this 
paper’s scope has been extremely limited to the male voice of this nascent movement, replicating 
the same patriarchal models nominally rejected by Jalloul and leaving the portrayal of this 
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growing movement in an uncomfortable position. If my research’s subject were to be revisited 
and/or expanded, this immense limitation should be avoided, interrogated and addressed. 
The Unclear Future of Post-Revolutionary Amazigh Activism: 
Asit has been shown,Amazigh activism after the revolution has exploded, the movement freed 
from the systematically marginalizing grip of the country’s postcolonial dictatorial regimes. 
Contrary to Tunisia’s dominant Arab-centered homogenous discourse, these activists and their 
ideas did exist and flourish under the Bourghiba and Ben Ali eras, yet because of these 
governments’ repressive policies and absolute denial of Amazigheity, they had to remain under 
the shadows, or ultimately give in to their unescapable context.Currently, the new constitution 
and government of Tunisia unfortunately do notaddress the problems brought forward by post-
revolutionary Amazigh activism, the ever-changing new democratic system of the state silently 
perpetuating the indifference and exclusion of its preceding dictatorships. This reality is 
worsened by the misplaced suspicion average Tunisians have against discussions of Amazigheity 
and the protection of remaining Amazigh communities. In the face of these and other internal 
challenges, pro-Amazigh civil society actors have embraced different strategies to rewrite the 
discourse of Tunisia’s culture and identity, including manifestations and rallies, hosting of 
international Amazigh events,online awareness-raising, and an amalgamation of festivals and 
cultural events.It is important to note that unlike how the majority of academic and professional 
coverage of this topic refers to the Amazigh movement in Tunisia as a ‘minority issue,’ 
truncating the conversation with statements related to the genuinely small number of Amazigh 
communities in the country, the activism, ideology and objectives of the individuals involved in 
these questions seek to not only protect the Imazgihen’s language and rights, but to challenge 
their society’s wider perception of their roots and culture. These are undoubtedly extremely hard 
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and ambitious tasks that can only take time, patience and calculation, but because ofTunisian 
politics’ currentobsession with its democratic transition and the ominous fragmentation of 
Amazigh activists, the future of this movement is significantlyunclear. As a perhaps way of 
measuring the prospects of this activism, it will be interesting to witness the upcoming 
celebrations for the Amazigh New Year in Tunisia, which I learned while interviewing Khaled 
Khemira coincidentally fall on January 14 2015, the same daythat marks the fourth yearof the 
successful 2011 Tunisian Revolution. 
 Although admittedly quite limited in methods and scope, this paper can hopefully be 
considered as a step in filling the unjustly large academic gap in the study of Tunisian 
Imazighen, their historical marginalization, and this no longer deniable growing cultural/political 
movement. If not a dynamic analysis of the post-revolutionary activism for the ‘invisible’ 
Tunisian Amazigh, this project can at least be regarded as an imperfect documentationof the 
status of the Imazighen in Tunisia and the current work of pro-Amazigh actors in the country, as 
well as an explicit challenge to the perception of Tunisia’s flawless Arab homogeneity.For future 
studies, I’d recommend exploring local associations working in actual Tunisian Amazigh 
communities; looking into pro-Amazigh actors’ involvement in mainstream Tunisian politics; 
assessing the opinions of disengaged and politicized Tunisians towards this topic; insisting on 
the official stance of the ruling government towards these questions; and following up with the 
fragmentation of the movement and the ensuing paradoxical multiplication of Amazigh-oriented 
associations and groups.As a clarification, the author of this paper acknowledges the validityof 
the Arab/Muslim identity of Tunisia, which grew out of centuries of influence and an anti-
colonialist project of self-empowerment and nation-building. Yet the irrefutable roots of the 
country and its original inhabitants must be remembered, respected and recognized, particularly 
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in the current complex setting of democratic openness and globalization: Tunisians may 
irreversibly lose themselves if they do not have a stable sense of self and identity to look back to. 
Notes: 
1. “En prélude, il est nécessaire de s’arrêter sur quelques éléments du contexte tunisien voir maghrébin 
des «fragmentations post-coloniales»: l’édification des Etats-nation post-coloniaux ont, à l’instar de tout 
nationalisme, produit une rhétorique identitaire uniciste autour de la culture arabe et de la religion 
islamique construite notamment en contre-réponse à la présence coloniale française (…) Comptant une 
très faible présence de berbérophones, la Tunisie est sous le joug d’un discours d’une homogénéité sans 
faille le laissant apparaitre comme «le pays du Maghreb le plus homogène», relayé par la recherche en 
sciences sociales notamment française”(Pouessel 2012, Frontières identitaires p. 3) 
2. “Dans les années 1970, le « problème » du bilinguisme arabe-berbère se posait encore dans les villages 
du Sud-tunisien, de Douiret et Chenini (Louis, 1975), contraignant les instituteurs à « dé-berbériser » les 
élèves. La « pression de l’arabophonie » a ensuite fait « basculer » l’importance numérique des 
berbérophones d’une majorité à une minorité (Souriau, 1980). Au sein de la Tunisie bourguibiste, la 
berbérité, bien qu’intégrée dans l’historicité de l’identité nationale affichée, rime avec une ruralité 
dépassée. Elle fera tout de même figure d’appât à un tourisme en soif d’exotisme, de primitivité” 
(Pouessel 2012, L’Année du Maghreb) 
3. Interviewed in café in Tunis medina Nov. 22, 2014. Meeting in English. 
4. “Dans les deux cas, la Toile a joué un rôle important permettant de pallier l'absence (Tunisie) ou la 
faiblesse (Libye) des structures revendicatives et des espaces réels, ce qui favoriserait le débat sur ces 
questions, en contribuant à la renaissance d'une résistance identitaire dans ces pays” (Suárez Collado2013, 
p. 383) 
5. Interviewed in café in Ave. Habib Bourhiba, Tunis Nov. 23, 2014. Meeting in French. 
6. Interviewed in café in SidiBou Said and in Tunis medina on Nov. 20- 21, 2014. Meeting in English. 
7. Interviewed in café in Tunis medina on Dec. 5, 2014. Meeting in French. 
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8. Interviewed in CPR headquarters in Tunis on Nov. 28, 2014. Meeting in French. 
9. Interviewed in TWIZA (located in Tunis medina) on Nov. 25, 2014. Meeting in English. 
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